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Abstract. Anthropic reasoning has lately been strongly associated with the string theory landscape 
and some theories of particle cosmology, such as cosmological inflation. The association is not, 
contrary to multiple statements by physicists and philosophers alike, necessary. On the contrary, 
there are clear reasons and instances in which the anthropic reasoning is useful in a diverse range of 
fields such as planetary sciences, geophysics, future studies, risk analysis, origin of life studies, 
evolutionary theory, astrobiology and SETI studies, ecology, or even strategic studies and global 
policy. The association of anthropic reasoning with string theory and particle cosmology has not only 
become the standard wisdom, but has been often construed in a negative way, in order to 
demonstrate or insinuate that such reasoning is too abstract or even belongs to “fringe science”, 
remote from run-of-the-mill research practices in any other more “mundane” and less theoretical 
scientific discipline. The purpose of this paper is to (i) analyse some of the counter-examples to  the 
standard wisdom, (ii) suggest that the anthropic reasoning is more flexible, more general, and less 
fashion-driven than the detractors state. In addition, we consider some historical and/or 
extrascientific motivation for this persistent prejudice.  
Keywords: history and philosophy of physics – epistemology – anthropic reasoning – planetary 
science – risk analysis – bioethics  
 
1. Introduction: Why anthropic reasoning? 
Anthropic reasoning, understood in a loose enough sense, has been present in the history of ideas 
since ancient times.2 In modern science, it appears in Boltzmann’s famous 1895 retort to Zermelo on 
the topic of the origin of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, or the temporal asymmetry of the 
universe (Boltzmann 1895, p. 415): 
If we assume the universe great enough, we can make the probability of one relatively small part 
being in any given state (however far from the state of thermal equilibrium), as great as we please. 
We can also make the probability great that, though the whole universe is in thermal equilibrium, 
                                                          
1
 Also at Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, 
16/17 St Ebbe's Street, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK. E-mail: mcirkovic@aob.rs. 
2
 For some specific instances, see Dirkovid (2004). 
 our world is in its present state. It may be said that the world is so far from thermal equilibrium that 
we cannot imagine the improbability of such a state. But can we imagine, on the other side, how 
small a part of the whole universe this world is? Assuming the universe great enough, the probability 
that such a small part of it as our world should be in its present state, is no longer small. 
If this assumption were correct, our world would return more and more to thermal equilibrium; but 
because the whole universe is so great, it might be probable that at some future time some other 
world might deviate as far from thermal equilibrium as our world does at present. Then the afore-
mentioned H-curve would form a representation of what takes place in the universe. The summits of 
the curve would represent the world where visible motion and life exist.   
The issue at hand was whether the thermodynamical asymmetry (popular “arrow of time”) is a local 
or truly global, universe-wide phenomenon. The idea behind Boltzmann’s – or Boltzmann-Schuetz’s – 
approach was to explain the local thermodynamical disequilibrium by appealing to the size of the 
universe and the conditions necessary for our existence as living beings and observers. What can be 
„more anthropic“ than this? The whole polemic is interesting not only from the point of view of 
history of science (Steckline 1983), but also since Boltzmann's ideas could be recast in the modern 
multiverse context (Dirkovid 2003). However, it went largely unnoticed for quite a long time, and 
Boltzmann’s inception of the anthropic reasoning was recognized only about the time of the 
publication of the comprehensive monograph of Barrow and Tipler (1986).  
In the orthodox history of science, it was Dicke's (1961) rejoinder to Dirac's (in)famous “large-number 
hypothesis” (LNH) which first takes into account explicit condition for existence of observers at 
present.3 The locution “anthropic principle” comes from the study of Carter (1974), which defined 
anthropic principles and went some way to impose some order on the nature and quality of 
anthropic arguments used in cosmology thus far. For most people and sources, Carter’s study is the 
ultimate origin of anthropic reasoning, although it is already clear from the above (and detailed, 
although hardly unbiased, historical survey could be found in Barrow and Tipler 1986) that it only 
followed from previous considerations. 
From the start the debate revolved about the infamous problem of fine-tuning of fundamental 
constants of nature and cosmological parameters. While Dirac argued that some numerical 
relationships between those (understood as pure numbers, in order to avoid confusion stemming 
from man-made units of measurement) hold in the absolute sense throughout the history of the 
universe, Dicke has turned the explanatory issue “upside down” by asking when and how such 
approximate relationships could be observed. For example, we observe stars of age similar – within 
an order of a magnitude – to the age of the universe itself, since we are observers dependent on 
stars and stellar evolution for our existence. Either much earlier or much later, itwould be impossible 
that observers like us evolve in the universe, thus there is no surprise that we observe approximate 
relationship between these timescales. This conclusion of Dicke could be generalized to other fine-
tuning “coincidences”, as has been subsequently clarified. In any case, Dicke pioneered an approach 
which is evolutionary in nature, relying on the concept of observership, rather than (at least partly) 
metaphysical concepts of absolute laws.   
So, historically, anthropic reasoning has indeed emerged from cosmological considerations (for 
further historical summary see Ellis 2011). But it went much farther than this circumscribed domain 
                                                          
3
 See Dirac (1937, 1961). 
 in the 40+ years since Carter’s seminal work. And there is really no reason why it should not have, 
since what Carter himself understood well (e.g., Carter 1983, 1993), but what subsequent critics and 
supporters often failed to understand and appreciate, anthropic reasoning deals with observation-
selection effects, and has no teleological meaning whatsoever. It simply applies whenever the 
number or other properties of observers come into play and influence particular scientific result or 
claim. This disteleological nature of the anthropic reasoning has been best explicated in the seminal 
monograph by Bostrom (2002).  
Thus, it follows from the above outlined general argument that in many fields of science in which 
observation selection is likely to play some role, it is possible to use anthropic reasoning. An obvious 
example is biological evolution, which is itself the process through which observers have emerged so 
far.4 Obviously, the number and properties of observers at present impose constraints – possibly 
stringent constraints – on processes such as abiogenesis and subsequent unfolding of evolution. 
Another relevant domain is computer science, including the fields such as complexity theory, artificial 
intelligence (AI). About the same time when Dicke replied to Dirac’s LNH, the great pioneer of 
computer science, Norbert Wiener, published his famous Cybernetics (Wiener 1961). It contains a 
beautiful discussion of the observation-selection effects in the problem of the arrow of time:  
Our observations of the stars are through the agency of light, of rays or particles emerging from the 
observed object and perceived by us. We can perceive incoming light, but can not perceive outgoing 
light, or at least the perception of outgoing light is not achieved by an experiment as simple and 
direct as that of incoming light. ... This being the case, we can see those stars radiating to us and to 
the whole world; while if there are any stars whose evolution is in the reverse direction, they will 
attract radiation from the whole heavens, and even this attraction from us will not be perceptible in 
any way, in view of the fact that we already know our own past but not our future. Thus the part of 
the universe which we see must have its past-future relations, as far as the emission of radiation is 
concerned, concordant with our own. The very fact that we see a star means that its 
thermodynamics is like our own... Within any world with which we can communicate, the direction 
of time is uniform.
5  
Today, post-Barrow and Tipler and post-Bostrom, it is not difficult to recognize anthropic reasoning 
in Wiener's discourse. This is not a “Whiggish” interpretation of history – to forestall such criticism – 
since the issues Wiener discusses are still parts of open research programs and heterodox strategies 
should be not only permitted, but desirable; there is no established view which could enforce 
misreading of the historical evidence. 
Therefore, in stark contrast to the prevailing belief, anthropic arguments have an important tradition, 
and a role to play outside highly speculative fields of string theory and particle/quantum cosmology. 
In what follows I review some examples and argue for the role for anthropic arguments and 
explanatory reasoning much larger than hitherto assumed. The primary goal of this study is to 
dispense with the prejudice that anthropic reasoning is limited to extremely general and “abstract” 
or “remote” fields of particle cosmology and string theory. Detractors of anthropic reasoning (and 
they are legion; e.g., Maddox 1984; Earman 1987; Gould 1987; Wilson 1994; Pagels 1998; Manson 
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 2000; Mosterín 2000, 2005; Klee 2002; Smolin 2007; to mention just a few examples6) have 
traditionally argued that anthropic reasoning is quite limited in scope, and while most of them have 
not pressed this scope limitation as the main reason for rejecting the anthropic reasoning, the meme 
has spread around. To show that it is wrong, therefore, and that the anthropic reasoning is much 
broader in scope as an explanatory strategy, leads to weakening the entire sceptical case. In 
particular, it includes weakening the sceptical strategy in the domain of fundamental physics, where 
currently the greatest battles are waged.  
Let us consider just a couple of examples of the sceptical discourse. Earman (1987) writes in his well-
publicized – and largely outdated – critique of the anthropic reasoning: 
But to be legitimate, the anthropic reasoning must be backed by substantive reasons for 
believing in the required worlds-within-worlds structure... Neither classical general 
relativity nor quantum mechanics provide any firm grounds for taking worlds-within-
worlds models seriously, and while various speculative versions of the new inflationary 
cosmology may eventually provide such ground, the verdict is at present very much in 
doubt.7 
Note that not only is the application of the anthropic reasoning strictly circumscribed in Earman’s 
account, but specific advances in cosmology are required as prerequisites for anthropic explanations.  
Pagels (1998) goes along: 
My own view is that although we have not yet discovered the most basic physical laws, 
if we do, the possibility of life in a universe governed by those laws will in some sense be 
written into them. The existence of life is not a selective principle acting on those laws; 
rather, it is a consequence of them. Whether or not I am right, it is simply premature to 
invoke the anthropic principle until the origin of the universe is much better understood.   
So, we have a clear pattern here: it is alleged that the anthropic reasoning makes at least some sense 
in cosmology, but is strictly rejected in other fields. This limitation is then used to diminish and 
denigrate the usage of anthropic reasoning even in cosmology. Note that Pagels' argument is at best 
a special pleading: that the possibility of life is allowed by the most basic laws is a truism, since what 
else could it be (so long as we are metaphysical naturalists)? At worst, it is an outright straw-man 
argument, since we would be hard pressed to find anybody suggesting that the existence of life is not 
a consequence of the fundamental laws of physics. The indefinite article betrays Pagels’ crucial 
omission  – what he fails to address is the question how could life be a consequence of the most 
fundamental laws and not the consequence of them. The most fundamental laws – whatever 
precisely they are – almost certainly permit both universes without life and those with life; since we 
are obviously in the latter category, it is uncontroversial that our existence acts as a “selective 
principle” (to use Pagels' charged terminology) not on laws themselves, but on instantiations of these 
laws; not on the equations of dynamics, but on the multiple solutions of those equations. To believe 
that in contrast to all other theories ever devised in physics these equations will have just a single 
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 solution, smacks of  unsupported quasireligious faith. If they have multiple solutions then the 
question ‘Why do we observe solution A, rather than solutions B, C, ...?’ is entirely legitimate 
,scientific, pertinent, and unavoidable problem. So, Pagels' criticism is, in the final analysis, based on 
a quid pro quo (cf. Barnes 2012). 
Further, Mosterín (2005) in a spectacularly hostile review of the anthropic thinking argues: 
The universe (as far as we can know it) is something unique ('uni-verse' and 'uni-que' 
come from the same root 'uni', one). We can learn a posteriori how the universe is, but it 
makes no sense to speculate on how it should be on the basis of a priori statistical 
considerations. This is the reason why John Leslie's (1989) firing squad argument is 
flawed. He compared our existence to the survival of a sentenced man, because each of 
the guns in his execution squad misfires. Has someone (God?) tinkered with the guns 
beforehand? Of course, there have been lots of firing squads and seldom have all the guns 
misfired. There is a grim statistics of firing squads. But the universe is a unique historical 
fact. There are no statistics of universes. Besides, the components of the firing squad are 
people with the intention of shooting, but there are no intentions in the fabric of the 
universe. At least in usual language, fine tuning implies intentionality and multiplicity of 
cases. 
Here we can follow the reasoning of the detractors a few  steps further: since it is not really 
acceptable even in cosmology, then we do not need to consider anything further in declaring the 
anthropic reasoning completely bogus and devoid of sense. Some of the gaping holes in Mosterín’s 
argument are obvious (metaphysical commitment to a single universe, quid pro quo reference to the 
“usual language” in describing fine tunings, etc.), others are somewhat more subtle (commitment to 
a verificationist account of truth), yet others stem from ignorance or suspicion toward recent 
developments in science, especially particle and quantum cosmology and string theory. The best 
recent rebuttals of the claims of Mosterín and comp. are given by Carroll (2006) and Barnes (2012) in 
a technical manner, and by the great Leonard Susskind in his popular book (Susskind 2006). Part of 
the arguments Mosterín uses against the anthropic reasoning is from an auto-ironically imprecise 
paper by Klee (2002); see the comprehensive rebuttal in Walker and Dirkovid (2006). However, the 
detractors gained much traction in science, philosophy, and popular media. For example, anti-
anthropic papers are much easier to publish than pro-anthropic ones. Even corrections of obvious 
numerical errors in the anti-anthropic literature are lacking (as testified by the never corrected errors 
regarding the size and mass of the Milky Way in Klee’s paper), while detractors like Martin Gardner 
or Pagels relished in pointing out even trivially simple mistakes/typos in the encyclopaedic 
monograph of Barrow and Tipler.  
Nevertheless, the criticism often sounds better than it really is, since it invokes abstract and remote 
issues of cosmology and fundamental physics. A few people feel comfortable discussing “the most 
basic physical laws” or the issues of cosmological origins, since there is no intuitive grasp of them. 
Therefore, it pays off for the opponents of the anthropic reasoning to promote the dogma that this 
reasoning is inextricably linked to fundamental physics and cosmology. So, there is not only rhetorical 
but a game-theoretical motivation for the anti-anthropic campaign. In the following, I shall use 
examples from planetary science and risk analysis in order to refute the dogmatic prejudice that the 
anthropic reasoning is limited to highly abstract and non-intuitive domains of fundamental physics 
 and cosmology. Emancipation from the dogma leads not only to our increased explanatory freedom, 
but also to some quite practical consequences, as the examples from the domain of risk analysis will 
show. Therefore, the whole of this debate has profound ethical ramifications, which is too often 
conveniently ignored by the mainstream philosophers. I also speculate on the origin of hostile 
prejudices about anthropic reasoning in the concluding section.  
 
2. Anthropic arguments in planetary sciences and astrobiology 
In the domain of planetary sciences which experienced explosive growth in the last couple of 
decades there is a substantial room for anthropic argument. To a large degree, the development of 
planetary sciences, both within Solar system, and as applied to the large number of extrasolar 
planets, has been fuelled by the quest for habitability (Horneck and Rettberg 2007; Hanslmeier 
2009). According to NASA's Astrobiology Roadmap (Des Marais et al. 2008, p. 720):  
We must move beyond the circumstances of our own particular origins in order to develop a 
broader discipline, “Universal Biology.” Although this discipline will benefit from an understanding 
of the origins and limits of terrestrial life, it also requires that we define the environmental 
conditions and the chemical structures and processes that could support life on other habitable 
planets. Thus we need to exploit universal laws of physics and chemistry to understand polymer 
formation, self-organization processes, energy utilization, information transfer, and Darwinian 
evolution that might lead to the emergence of life in planetary environments other than Earth. ... 
Some conditions that support chemistry that is sufficiently rich to seed life might be detrimental to 
self-organization of biological structures. Conversely, conditions that promote the emergence of 
biological complexity might be unfavorable to organic chemistry. Thus an integrative,  
interdisciplinary approach is necessary to formulate the principles underlying universal biology. 
The perspectives gained from understanding these principles will markedly improve our ability to 
define habitability and recognize biosignatures. 
And subsequently (p. 727): 
Viewing Earth’s ecosystems in the context of astrobiology challenges us to consider how “resilient” 
life really is on a planetary scale, to develop mathematical representations of stabilizing feedbacks 
that permit the continuity of ecosystems in the face of rapidly changing physical conditions, and to 
understand the limits of these stabilizing feedbacks. Ideally this consideration will provide insight 
into the potential effects of environmental changes that are abrupt as well as those changes that 
unfold over time scales ranging from seasonal cycles to millions of years. 
Therefore, probability of observing specific properties of an environment – any environment in the 
Galaxy! – are linked with the number of observers, whose density is a consequence of complex 
evolutionary processes which could not be reasonably accounted for in the conventional causal 
manner. While planetary (to simplify things from the start!8) parameters are certain to play the 
determining role in the degree of habitability, they cannot be said to cause it in proximate sense. The 
relationship is similar to the one between fundamental physical constants like Planck constant, 
coupling constants of forces, or masses of quarks and leptons in the Standard Model on one side, and 
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 properties of the 12C nucleus exhibiting famous fine-tuning discovered by Sir Fred Hoyle (Dunbar et 
al. 1953; Hoyle 1954; Barrow and Tipler 1986) on the other side. In theory, fine-tunings of energy 
levels in the 12C nucleus are causally explained by properties (and, consequently, fine-tunings) of 
fundamental constants. If we accept ontological reductionism there is no other mystical factor there 
– the 12C nucleus consists of quarks and gluons obeying dynamical laws prescribed by quantum 
physics and nothing else, so its properties, including “controversial” ones, are reducible to the 
properties of the constituents. In practice, however, the 12C nucleus is too complex and too strongly-
interacting quantum system to be understood in terms of these basic ingredients.9 So we cannot 
track the fine-tuning in the 12C nucleus down to the fine-tuning of fundamental constants. In practice 
we are treating the fine-tuning in 12C as a distinct phenomenon.  
The analogy with other complex systems which are also prerequisites for life as we know it is 
obvious. In particular, habitable planets are complex outcomes of many lower-level factors of 
planetary sciences in a manner still more complicated than the 12C nucleus being complex outcome 
of many lower-level factors of quantum/particle physics. So we again cannot hope to track down 
apparently fine-tuned high-level properties to a set of basic, low-level planetary properties such as 
the total mass, chemical composition, distance from the parent star, etc. Hence, the very concept of 
habitability is inextricably linked to the anthropic reasoning – it summarizes physical prerequisites for 
particular spacetime density of observers. It is unimportant here that we tend to take this concept as 
unnecessarily narrow – it is not really required that the life we expect to emerge in habitable locales 
be exactly like the terrestrial one, or even very similar. We speak about potential for habitability on 
Jupiter's moon Europa below the thick ice crust, although we can be pretty certain that any Europan 
forms of life will have to be very different from anything we have encountered on Earth. So, instead 
of being anthropocentric, as criticisms directed at astrobiology often charge, the notion of 
habitability actually represents a scientific attempt to liberate ourselves from anthropocentrism 
while retaining the advantages of scientific method as developed among terrestrial biologists.  
In order to do so, understanding of preconditions leading to life, complex life and observership are 
necessary – and it is exactly the essence of anthropic reasoning such as contained in the works of 
Dicke or Bostrom or Barnes (and parallel with the one developed in cosmology and fundamental 
physics by Carter, Linde, Susskind, Tegmark, Hogan, Carroll, and others). An additional difficulty 
which makes the application of anthropic reasoning here more difficult lies in the feedback loops 
created by even very simple lifeforms, in which they influence their physical environment. This is in 
sharp contrast with the situation in fundamental physics and cosmology, where there is no feedback 
loop between life and observers on the one side and physical systems under study on the other 
(spatial and temporal scales are either too small or too large for observers to have meaningful 
impact). It is well-known, for example, that abiogenesis as currently understood could have only 
occurred in an anaerobic conditions; the present amount of oxygen in the atmosphere is solely a 
consequence of the evolution of photosynthetic life forms and their establishing dominance over 
methanogen and other contemporaries (e.g., Horneck and Rettberg 2007). In turn, the aerobic 
environment predominant on Earth since the “Great Oxygenation Event”, roughly 2.3 billion years 
before present, enabled emergence of a huge number of complex organisms, some of which have 
been the cause of further feedback loops in the environment. While these feedbacks play crucial role 
in the classic Gaia hypothesis and are still very much in play as explanatory vehicles (a great example 
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 being recent study of Chopra and Lineweaver 2016), we need not endorse any such general theory in 
order to perceive how habitability is highly emergent property for whose explanation all naive and 
greedy reductionist schemes simply fail. In their stead, we need at least something akin to the 
anthropic reasoning.  
A specific model is provided by the “rare Earth” hypothesis of Ward and Brownlee (2000). In a 
nutshell, it is a probabilistic argument suggesting that, while simple microbial life is probably 
ubiquitous throughout the Galaxy, complex biospheres, like the terrestrial one, are very rare due to 
the exceptional combination of many distinct requirements for high habitability. These requirements 
have become familiar to this day even in popular science accounts: Circumstellar habitable zone (a 
habitable planet needs to be in the very narrow interval of distances from the parent star in order to 
possess liquid water on surface), ”Rare Moon" (having a large moon to stabilize the planetary axis is 
crucial for long-term climate stability), "Rare Jupiter" (having a giant planet (‘Jupiter’) at the right 
distance to deflect much of incoming cometary and asteroidal material enables a sufficiently low 
level of impact catastrophes), "Rare nuclides" (radioactive r-elements – especially 238U and 232Th – 
need to be present in the planetary interior in sufficient amounts to enable plate tectonics and the 
functioning of the carbon–silicate cycle), etc. There are other items on the list as well – in this sense, 
„rare Earth“ hypothesis is an open theoretical system, since everyone is free to add items pertaining 
to a particular area of relevance and expertise. However, the general reasoning is that all these 
requirements are mostly independent and a priori unlikely, so that their combination is bound to be 
incredibly rare and probably unique in the Milky Way. Without entering into pros and cons of this 
important hypothesis (and there are many items on both sides of the ledger!), we need to 
understand that there is nothing contradictory between the conclusion that complex biospheres are 
extremely rare and the empirical observation that we are living in a complex biosphere. 
Contradiction is removed by – lo and behold! – the anthropic reasoning. It is the anthropic reasoning 
which accounts for the Bayesian probability shift: since we require complex biosphere to exist as 
observers with an extremely high probability,10 we need to update our probabilistic beliefs 
accordingly. 
In addition, the rare Earth paradigm assumes something about the duration of time necessary for the 
processes leading to complex biospheres to complete. This is the topic of another empirical success 
of the anthropic reasoning, namely Carter’s relation, which predicts the probable length of time the 
Earth will remain a habitable planet from the number of improbable steps that occurred in the 
evolution of intelligent life on Earth (Carter 1983). If the total habitable lifetime of Earth, both past 
and future is denoted by T and the time necessary to evolve intelligent observers like us is te, Carter 
argues that it should hold that /eT t T n  , where n is the number of “critical steps” (or 
“improbable steps” or “key transitions”) in the evolutionary process. Clearly, a relation between 
these numbers is neither obvious nor trivial – without going into whether it is verified or falsified, it 
certainly is an empirical claim. Yet Carter’s relation is a consequence of the traditional “weak” 
anthropic principle: self-selection from our nature as intelligent observers which evolved on a 
habitable planet. 
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 Finally, one might argue that the first anthropic argument in planetary sciences appeared centuries 
ago, in the work of French philosopher and naturalist Bernard Le Bouyier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), 
published in 1686, a single year before the great scientific revolution inaugurated by Newton's 
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In the next places, the reason why the planes of their [comets'] motions are not in the plane of the 
ecliptic, or any of the planetary orbits, is extremely evident; for had this been the case, it would have 
been impossible for the Earth to be out of the way of the comets’ tails. Nay, the possibility of an 
immediate encounter or shock of the body, of a comet would have been too frequent; and 
considering how great is the velocity of a comet at such a time, the collision of two such bodies must 
necessarily be destructive of each other; nor perhaps could the inhabitants of planets long survive 
frequent immersions in the tails of comets, as they would be liable to in such a situation. Not to 
mention anything of the irregularities and confusion that must happen in the motion of planets and 
comets, if their orbits were all disposed in the same plane. 
 
Thus, to the question: why are (observed) orbits of comets highly inclined, in contradistinction to the 
coplanar planetary orbits? Fontenelle offers a deceptively simple answer. We would not be here – to 
contemplate on the peculiarities of cometary trajectories – if these orbits were different (that is, 
similar to those of planets). In modern rendition, our existence in a stable environment selects some 
planetary+cometary configuration out of the entire set of all such configuration possible under the 
dynamical laws. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the observed planetary+cometary 
configuration will be typical or average. This passage of Fontenelle had been published 8 years 
before celebrated Halley's suggestion of December 12, 1694, that comets might collide with planets 
(published in Halley 1704): 
This is spoken to Astronomers: But, what might be the Consequences of so near an Appulse; or of a 
Contact; or, lastly, of a Shock of the Coelestial Bodies, (which is by no means impossible to come to 
pass) I leave to be discuss'd by the Studious of Physical Matters.  
This famous idea has been followed up by such luminaries as Newton, Wright, Laplace, Lagrange, and 
others, in the vein of what is usually (and only partially justifiable) called “Biblical catastrophism” of 
the pre-Cuvier epoch.13 Fontenelle wrote the passage 18 years before Newton wondered (in 
Opticks):14 
Whence is it that planets move all one and the same way in orbs concentrick, while comets move 
all manner of ways in orbs very excentric... blind Fate could never make all the planets move one 
and the same way in orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable irregularities excepted, which may 
have risen from the mutual actions of comets and planets upon one another, and which will be apt 
to increase, till this system wants a reformation. Such a wonderful uniformity in the planetary 
system must be allowed the effect of choice. 
Thus Newton, as a promoter of the Design argument in natural philosophy, failed to understand the 
power of the Fontenelle's argument, and went deeper into a blind alley (from the modern point of 
view) of seeking the supernatural Design and/or supernatural regulating mechanism. The same 
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 tension between the apparent design and the explanatory “filtering” through various observation 
selection effects persists to this day, and is the source of innumerable debates and confusions.15 
And the issue of perception of peculiarity of the inhabited subset of planets in the entire set is a 
legitimate target of physical inquiry – the one which is directly guided by anthropic reasoning. Again, 
like in the cosmological case, we have three possible options of explaining the peculiar (non-planar) 
nature of cometary orbits in our Solar system. The first is to deny the validity and meaningfulness of 
the question; this is the standard theistic answer which forbids further discussion. In the less direct 
and allegedly more philosophical manner, we could speak about this state-of-affairs as being a brute 
fact. The theistic answer can hardly be further discussed, and the explanatory nihilism/brute-factism 
seems irrational today, since we know that the Solar system forms a tiny part of a much larger whole. 
As to the origin and properties of this larger whole (the Galaxy) we do have different (and working!) 
explanations – it would be truly strange to expect that the property of minuscule planetary system 
like ours cannot, even in principle, be explained.16  
From the other two options, one—causal—entails the idea that there is a law-like reason 
(presumably to be derived from the future “Theory of Everything” or some other high-level physical 
theory) for atypical or surprising structure of the early Solar system. In other words, an enormous 
amount of information necessary for description of the atypical initial conditions can be encoded in 
some new law(s) of nature and consequent law-like correlations of various matter and vacuum fields. 
This option is still viable for cosmology, but hardly for planetary cosmogony. Cosmogonical initial 
conditions are not privileged in any way over initial conditions for any other physical process; we do 
not seek an explanation for (say) the formation of chemical elements or the formation of the ozone 
layer or for origin of ice ages in a future unified field theory. We seek it much lower down on the 
epistemological ladder – and higher in terms of complexity of the explanans. Moreover, the very 
existence of such higher-level theory to which the explanatory work could be outsourced seems 
highly dubious, again in the light of the necessity for such theory to explain other planetary systems 
in the Galaxy as well. Some of them – and perhaps most of them – seem to be very different from the 
Solar System (e.g., Kepler-16b; Doyle et al. 2011).  
The third—anthropic—option is to avoid giving a specific description through embedding those 
conditions into a sufficiently symmetric (“typical”) background. Again, stated in terms of information, 
the same long description of what we perceive as atypical initial conditions arises—as so often in 
physics!—from the process of symmetry breaking. The overall description is simple enough, and may 
be reduced (in the extreme case) to a rule similar to “All possible combinations of initial conditions 
exist.” That such a high degree of symmetry can indeed completely reproduce the situation in our 
particular cosmological domain becomes an immediate consequence (cf. Tegmark 1996, 2008; Collier 
1996). Observation selection effect then accounts for features of the observed system required for 
the local observers to exist. 
Let us now think of the application of this mode of thinking to the particular cosmogonical issue. We 
would similarly say “planetary systems with all possible configurations of planetary and cometary 
orbits exist” as a part of the larger whole (say our Galaxy). Now, we ask: are all such configurations 
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 I shall return to the issue of explanatory nihilism in the section 4 below. 
 compatible with our existence (on a planet!)? And the answer, intuitively clear even to Fontenelle, 
with his rudimentary understanding of preconditions for complex life and intelligence, seems to be 
negative. Planetary “irregularities and confusions” would have likely resulted in the absence of all 
observers, contrary to the empirical evidence. There is only a subset of all configurations leading to 
the emergence of us as intelligent observers, namely the one in which collisions between planets and 
smaller bodies (comets and asteroids) are not too frequent. Thus, our existence acts as an 
observational selection effect (cf. Bostrom 2002), or “filter” selecting those sites – in this case 
planetary systems – where configurations of cometary orbits are in some sense atypical. There is 
nothing inherently problematic in this methodological approach – or at least nothing more 
problematic than in explaining properties of stellar surveys by the Malmquist bias, or paleontological 
extinctions by the Signor-Lipps effect, etc. All of these are just manifestations of the observation 
selection-effects, which need to be studied and corrected for in the context of the anthropic 
reasoning.  
 
3. Anthropic arguments in risk analysis 
Another scientific field which by default deals with variable number of observers is risk analysis – in 
particular when applied to large catastrophic risks (Bostrom and Dirkovid 2008). In the previous 
section, we have seen that one of the “rare Earth” requirements is that a habitable planet is not 
subjected to impact and supernova risks more severe than a particular threshold value. Let us now 
focus on Earth and consider big natural hazards: how do we actually measure the level of such 
historical catastrophic risks as impacts or supervolcanoes?17 Usual procedure (e.g., Woo 1999) is to fit 
a distribution to a sufficiently big database of the events of well-defined type in terms of both 
severity and time. From calculated moments of this distribution one can compute further values of 
interest, for instance the probability of an earthquake of magnitude larger than S hitting within next 
T years, or the probability a supereruption emitting more than V cubic kilometers of ash and dust 
over the same interval of time. The database is in most cases built up from historical evidence (or 
even indirectly, from the fossil record). Empirical predictions are, in general, moments of the 
distribution function of any particular risk. 
The usual procedure does not take into account the tally of observers. Therefore, it is subject to a 
specific bias called the anthropic shadow in Dirkovid, Sandberg, and Bostrom (2010): a part of the 
parameter space of large catastrophic events is not adequately sampled, due to its incompatibility 
(or weaker compatibility, so to speak) with our existence as observers at present. In other words, the 
usual procedure, which does not distinguish between the directions of time (the distribution function 
is assumed to be the same, or similar, or obtained by the same procedure in the future as in the past) 
fails to account for the selection effects. Consequently, it leads not only to undersampling of the total 
empirical dataset, but to underestimates of the predicted risks as well. The past record is unrealiable, 
due to our presence as observers in the present; and it is unreliable in the consistently misleading 
direction – it makes our environment seem safer than it really is. This is a quintessentially anthropic 
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 effect with a wide range of consequences, from risk analysis to epistemology of historical science to 
ethics and politics of risk.  
Anthropic shadow is easiest to understand through a particular example of a specific risk whose 
magnitude we assess from historical data: terrestrial impact craters. Craters are consequences of 
impacts of small Solar System bodies (asteroids and comets) upon Earth's surface. Impacts produce 
physical effects ranging from local and small (most of meteorites, like the famous Murchison 
meteorite which fell in Australia in 1969), to regional and severely destructive (e.g., the event which 
created Barringer crater in Arizona about 50,000 years ago), to global and cataclysmic (e.g., the 
Chicxulub impact, 65 million years ago at the K/Pg boundary). There are 188 confirmed impact 
craters on Earth at the time of this writing (February 2016).18 There is, obviously, a relationship 
between the size of the impactor and the size of the crater created, although the relationship is non-
linear and complicated, needing to account for properties such as chemical composition of the 
impactor, incident angle, etc. (Hughes 2003). But if we do not bother with such complications, we 
can gauge the severity of an impact catastrophe by the size of an impact crater. So, in the long term, 
the list of known impact craters will give us the distribution function of impact catastrophes – and by 
reconstructing it we can predict or retrodict the catastrophe of a given size in a given time interval; 
for example, we can answer the question how probable is a Chixhulub-size impact within next 1000 
years from now. Of course, we need to deal with “classical” selection effects, such as erosion, 
incompleteness of our crater list, etc. 
However, this neglects another key selection effect: the fact that our existence as observers as 
present does impose limitations on the possible risk distribution functions. Not all distribution 
functions compatible with all the historical evidence are compatible with our existence as observers 
(and our number) at present. So, those historical trajectories are falsely taken into account – in 
essence, subsumed into – in constructing the distribution function. We need to unravel this biased 
sampling in order to get to the real (or a posteriori) distribution function, giving us the real 
magnitude of risk. Surprisingly enough, as shown by Dirkovid et al. (2010), the correction leads to 
underestimating the risk or overconfidence. In our example of impact risk, it is clear that there is no 
chance whatsoever to find a 100km-size crater younger than 1 million years, and that a probability of 
find such huge crater younger than 10 million years is minuscule. This is because such catastrophe 
would have caused the extinction of humankind, if it happened, or would have cut the evolutionary 
chain leading to humans if further in the past. On the other hand, the probability of such crater being 
formed in the next million years is certainly not zero, and the probability of its formation in the next 
10 million years is sizeable (e.g., Grieve and Shoemaker 1994). But since the moments of the same 
distribution function must be the same in both past and the future, we can only infer that the real 
risk is greater than that calculated by the standard procedure.  
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Figure 1: A sketch of the anthropic bias: we do not fairly sample the entire time-severity plane of large risks, 
only a region compatible with our existence at this particular epoch (the rest is in the “anthropic shadow” – 
shaded region, see text). The current epoch is denoted by t0 and we count time from the formation of our 
planet (from Dirkovid et al. 2010). Even if the amount of bias is small – that is, if evolution is convergent and 
robust against perturbations – this is still a legitimate effect which clearly demonstrates the importance of 
anthropic thinking in the field of risk analysis. Q = 0 events are completely destructive events which leave no 
survivors. 
What happens as we increase – in a thought experiment if not actual historical record – the severity 
of the catastrophic event whose probability we wish to calculate? Catastrophic events exceeding 
some threshold severity eliminate all observers and all ecological conditions necessary for 
subsequent emergence of observers, and are hence unobservable. Some types of catastrophes may 
also make the existence of observers on a planet impossible in some subsequent interval, the size of 
which might be correlated with the magnitude of the catastrophe. Because of this bias, the events 
reflected in our historical record are not sampled from the full events space but rather from the part 
of the events space that lies beneath the “anthropic compatibility boundary” (illustrated in Figure 1). 
The part of the parameter space above the boundary lies in what can be called anthropic shadow: 
the observation selection effect implicit in conditioning on our present existence prevents us from 
sharply discerning magnitudes of extreme risks close (in both temporal and evolutionary terms) to 
us. This shadow is the source of bias which must be corrected when we seek to infer the objective 
chance distribution from the observed empirical distribution of events. 
So much about anthropic selection effects in our past. What about the future? Global catastrophic 
risk studies uniformly indicate that the biggest threats for humanity’s future now belong to 
anthropogenic risks, such as nuclear winter, anthropogenic global warming or misuse of 
biotechnology or nanotechnology. Overconfidence following neglect of the anthropic bias applies 
here as well – if we have a bias in calculating the distribution function of impact catastrophes from 
the past leading us to underestimating impact risk, this is not dissimilar from reasoning that since 
there was no nuclear war in the last cca. 60 years, the risk of its occurring is smaller than we would a 
 priori expect. The lack of our prior historical experience does not diminish expected risk – it enhances 
it; while this may sound counterintuitive, it is a direct consequence of the anthropic reasoning.   
This introduces overconfidence in our probabilistic estimates of the magnitude of risk above given 
severity, leading to possibly detrimental neglect of research and mitigation of particular possibly risky 
processes. Therefore, what is essentially a philosophical question about justification and 
discrimination between explanatory hypotheses becomes a very serious and very practical issue: do 
we underestimate the risks we are unavoidably facing? If the answer is affirmative, this leads straight 
to the situation in which methodological biases and neglects lead to increasing likelihood of harm for 
billions of humans and uncountable number of other living beings. (This can be generalized to other 
hypothetical intelligent communities in the Galaxy through another anthropic argument, as has been 
done by Tegmark and Bostrom 2005.) 
So, in this case the downplaying of anthropic reasoning might be not only bad science and bad 
philosophy, but might be ultimately unethical as well. Since at least some of the processes subject to 
anthropic shadow could lead to the ultimate harm (Persson and Savulescu 2008), only minor auxiliary 
assumptions are necessary to conclude that it is our moral duty to increase our understanding and, 
ultimately, resilience to such processes. If anti-anthropic dogma stands in the way of better 
understanding, then this shows not only cognitive bankruptcy of such dogma, but the moral 
bankruptcy as well. 
 
4. Discussion 
It is quite easy to realize that the anthropic reasoning is, in fact, applicable to all fields and problems 
where processes could lead, or indeed have historically led, to a significant change in the number of 
observers. While such fields and problems are still not numerous, they delineate an area much wider 
than what is usually circumscribed to cosmology and the “bottom” of fundamental physics. To those 
mentioned above, one may add many other contribution from various other fields; for instance, 
Reinganum’s (1986) “financial proof” of the impossibility of time travel also belongs to this category, 
since it depends on observation selection against observers belonging to a particular reference class 
(those time travelling from the future to the present). The present discussion could be understood as 
a provocation and call for more similar examples from different scientific disciplines. This could help 
in defending the whole province of explanatory work from interference by mysticism and religion-
inspired abuse.  
Moreover, any research involving situations – possible or actual – with changing number of 
observers, are necessarily a subject to the anthropic bias. It is mandatory, not optional, to account 
and correct for this bias. Conversely, it is bad science not to do it, no matter what philosophical and 
methodological prejudices might be in play. In my view, it is also a case of bad philosophy to call for 
rejection of the question or explanatory nihilism without previously investigating all explanatory 
options and finding them unacceptable. Unfortunately, the nihilistic approach still has many 
adherents when it comes to explanation of very general phenomena of cosmology and fundamental 
physics (e.g., Callender 2004; Mosterín 2005); the idea is that the issues such as the initial entropy of 
the universe or the strength ratios of low-energy effective forces are so general that everything else, 
including entities used in a potential explanation, is contingent upon those fundamental “almost 
 brute” facts. (The qualification “almost” pertains to the lip service given to possible future advances 
in physics, which is often not taken seriously at all. Thus Mosterín claims, for instance, that “the most 
desirable epistemic situation would be that the values of the fundamental constants... could one day 
be derived from some fundamental physical theory. In the mean time (and this mean time can last 
forever) they have to be accepted as brute facts.” *emphasis M. M. D.+ Barring the decision of some 
Central Committee of Science or a Supreme Philosophical Leader, I completely fail to see any reason 
whatsoever for such compulsion.) So we cannot formulate a causal explanations for those ultra-deep 
empirical facts about the physical universe, since we do not know in terms of what to formulate such 
an explanation. We should accept them as primitive happenstances and proceed further from that.  
Clearly, the nihilistic strategy fails in clearly circumscribed fields such as planetary science or risk 
analysis considered above. It would be unacceptable – not to mention rude – to reject further 
discussion in these fields even in cases where due to historical loss of information we do not have 
insight in causal agents acting in distant past. While rudeness has not been, however, below some of 
the anthropic detractors' discourse – e.g., abovementioned numerical errors in the paper by Klee 
(2002) criticising anthropic theorists for laxity with numbers – it is obvious that those parts of the 
battleground are effectively lost. We cannot consciously avoid discussing the impact of habitability 
on the number of observers or selection effects downsizing huge physical risks we are facing. In the 
latter case, declining to engage in the discussion has adverse morale consequences as well. So, 
examples like those discussed in the present paper act to decrease our confidence in explanatory 
nihilism even in cosmology or string theory, quite independently of actually affirming the value of the 
anthropic reasoning.  
We conclude with a subjective and speculative outline of what could be an interesting project in 
sociology and psychology of science. It is a telling phenomenon that the existence of wide 
applications of anthropic reasoning has been a “well-guarded secret” for quite some time – and that 
the prejudice that only relevant conclusions could be drawn from it in string theory and cosmology is 
so widespread. I suspect that a major factor in resistance to anthropic arguments and explanations is 
the fact that they go against received wisdom of two otherwise strongly opposed broad camps, 
which, for the lack of better words, I will call naive reductionism and naive teleology. In both cases, 
the qualification “naive” is central, since anthropic accounts – as discussed above – do not really 
undermine the role of reductionism and, to a limited extent, teleology in explanations. It is one of 
those prejudices which is strongly supported by proponents of two otherwise opposing views – and 
therefore it is much harder to reject. In the course of the Cold War, for instance, both sides have 
been in agreement, for very different reasons, of course, that USSR and its satellite dictatorships are 
countries of “real socialism”. Many honest and well-intentioned social-democrats or non-Marxist 
socialists in the West have had a hard time in trying to dispel this notion, since it was promoted by 
both powerful propaganda apparati. The position of anthropic theorist is similarly uncomfortable, 
being attacked by both naive reductionists and naive teleologists; the metaphor of Scylla and 
Charybdis immediately comes to mind. Both naive positions strive to contain anthropic reasoning – if 
they cannot stamp it out completely – as a contagious heresy, which must not pollute “normal” fields 
of inquiry. Hence completely nonsensical repeated claims that the anthropic reasoning deals in 
tautologies, which cannot tell us anything we don't already know; quite to the contrary, those are 
quite informative tautologies, which tell us much about the world. 
 Naive reductionism, usually sprinkled with remnants of logical positivism, cannot ever come to terms 
with the idea than extremely complex structures such as intelligent observers may play a role in 
explanation on any level. Naive reductionists tend to reject or downplay any explanation which is not 
mechanist and atomic explanation and implicitly hold the dogma that there must be a unique 
underlying micro-level causal account for any observed macro-level phenomenon. Obviously, the 
reference to observers and their historical experience contained in the very heart of the anthropic 
reasoning is anathema to naive reductionists. It is very similar to suspicions and misunderstandings 
characterizing the response of many secular scientists and philosophers to neodarwinian 
evolutionary paradigm; in both cases I suspect deeply rooted suspicion toward using extremely 
complex and inevitably historical entities in explanatory accounts.19 (And other modes of 
explanation, in particular geometric or topological ones, fare no better at hand of naive reductionists; 
this only confirms that naive reductionism should be fought against and overcome as much as 
possible.) 
Similarly, naive teleologists are dismayed by the disteleology of anthropic reasoning. What could be a 
splendid opportunity for prolonged mystical musings on the “relationship of mind and the universe”, 
“the role of mind *or Mind+ in the overall scheme of things”, and similar theatrical clichés, is suddenly 
discounted as the consequence of simple observation selection effects and could be quantitatively 
modelled in Bayesian terms! How terribly inconvenient. And not only creationists and similar 
backward scarecrows feel uncomfortable. While naive teleology is, at first glance, mostly absent from 
serious literature in at least last several decades and therefore seemingly presents no serious threat 
to science, one should remain highly vigilant, since anti-Copernican, teleological, and anthropocentric 
thinking is still powerfully present in popular culture (including many instance of popular science and 
philosophy), as well as in large segments of the media, politics, arts, and humanistics. Especially 
when coupled with more virulent strains of social constructivism, epistemic relativism and 
postmodernism, it still has the capacity to do great and hard-to-repair harm. But even in the 
relatively benign form exhibited, for instance, by Midgley (1985) or the anthropic detractors cited in 
the introduction such as Earman or Pagels or Mosterin, it can produce confusion and lead to closed-
mindedness on many sensitive scientific issues, from animal sentience, to artificial intelligence, to 
SETI projects.  
That the double fallacy of both naive reductionists and naive teleologians has some traction is 
testified, in a bizarre way, by perhaps the least naive of the naive teleologians of the 20th century, Sir 
Fred Hoyle, who in his popular book The Intelligent Universe proclaimed that “*t+he same nihilistic 
belief that no aspect of the Universe can be thought of as a consequence of purpose underlies both 
Darwinism and the anthropic principle.”  (Hoyle 1983) His caricature of Darwinism amounts to what I 
have above labelled naive reductionism (specifically in biology). It sounds funny and outright bizarre 
today, but Hoyle seems to had been fully aware that there are altogether three positions, rather than 
two, and that the third one, which is the anthropic reasoning, is bound to be regarded with suspicion 
and hostility by the adepts of the other two. 
The expanded mandate of the anthropic reasoning, as dealing with any field with variable number of 
observers, could easily be branched into other domains. Elaboration of the properties of observers 
requires multidisciplinary collaboration between mathematics and physics of complexity, 
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 evolutionary biology and astrobiology, neurosciences, risk analysis, and philosophy. There is a wide 
front along which progress could be made by better understanding and building quantitative models 
of physical, chemical, planetological, etc. preconditions for observership. Both work in artificial 
intelligence and in zoopsychology and in SETI studies should give us insight into properties of 
observers different from ourselves. Fields which we have on purpose avoided here, cosmology and 
fundamental physics, give us tantalizing glimpses of the multiverse, and the interest in physical 
properties of other universes and their habitability grows almost by day.20 Prospects for further 
research are bright indeed. Diametrally opposed to the dark, scholastic, uninformative picture 
painted by the detractors, the anthropic reasoning is indeed liberating, future-oriented and unifying.  
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